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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
   
 
No. 13-1945 
____________ 
 
SHAN EN ZHANG;  
JUAN CHEN,  
a/k/a 
KO-MIN TSAO, 
 
                                 Petitioners    
            
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
      
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A089-252-304 & A095-710-240) 
Immigration Judge: Alberto J. Riefkohl 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 7, 2013 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, Jr., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
         
 
(Opinion filed:  December 13, 2013) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
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 Shan En Zhang and his wife Juan Chen seek review of a final order of removal 
rendered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying a motion to reopen their 
proceeding.  We will deny the petition for review. 
I. Background 
 Petitioners, Zhang and Chen, are citizens of the People’s Republic of China.  Chen 
entered the United States without valid documents on May 29, 2005, and was subject to 
removal proceedings after the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to 
Appear under the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(1).  
Zhang arrived in the United States on August 4, 2007, also without valid entry 
documents, after being smuggled from China.  Petitioners subsequently met in the United 
States and registered their marriage in New York on December 12, 2007.  The 
Immigration Judge (IJ) consolidated the cases for Zhang and Chen, who had both applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT), claiming persecution by Chinese authorities for their practice of Falun Gong. 
 At the merits hearing, Zhang claimed that he departed China after Chinese 
authorities detained and beat him for his practice of Falun Gong.  Chen stated that she 
began her practice of Falun Gong after meeting Zhang and that together they attended 
Falun Gong demonstrations to protest China’s suppression of Falun Gong.  On June 16, 
2008, the IJ issued an oral decision, finding that Zhang failed to sufficiently corroborate 
his claims and that Chen lacked evidence to support her claims.  The IJ denied 
Petitioners’ applications.  On October 30, 2009, the BIA dismissed their appeal. 
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 On December 30, 2009, Petitioners concurrently filed their first motion to reopen 
before the BIA, claiming that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution because 
certain Chinese residents in America discovered Zhang’s involvement in Falun Gong and 
reported his activities in China.  Zhang contended that government cadres had confronted 
his parents about his Falun Gong involvement and told them that Zhang must return to 
China for punishment.  In addition, Petitioners requested that the October 30, 2009, BIA 
decision be reissued.  On April 27, 2010, the BIA reissued its decision and denied the 
motion to reopen.  We denied Petitioners’ appeal on April 15, 2011.  Zhang v. Att’y Gen., 
423 Fed. Appx. 243 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 The instant proceedings concern Petitioners’ second motion to reopen, filed on 
October 2, 2012, in which Petitioners argued that their motion should not be barred by 
the 90-day time requirement because they can show that country conditions have 
worsened in China for Falun Gong practitioners.  Chen argued to the BIA that Chinese 
authorities visited her mother in China, where they cautioned her that Chen must return to 
China for severe punishment.  Petitioners submitted additional evidence in support of 
their motion to reopen, including a local village notice stating that Chinese authorities 
will punish Chen for her Falun Gong participation, an affidavit from Chen’s mother 
averring the same, a 2007 asylum report from the U.S. Department of State, and several 
news articles regarding Falun Gong punishment in China.  
 On March 15, 2013, the BIA found that Petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to 
establish that treatment of Falun Gong practitioners had materially changed to excuse the 
untimely and number-barred motion to reopen.  First, “[t]o the contrary, the background 
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evidence reflects that Falun Gong was banned by the Chinese government in July 1999 
prior to respondent’s June 2008 hearing,” and that any continuing mistreatment “does not 
reflect a material change in circumstances, but rather, a continuation of practices that 
have existed for many years in China.”  Second, the BIA found that the evidence 
submitted in support of  “changed circumstances” was speculative and unauthenticated.  
Finally, with respect to Chen, the BIA determined “that she began practicing Falun Gong 
in 2008, which is a change in personal circumstances that does not constitute a change 
‘arising in’ China” to meet the exception to the 90-day time limit.   
II. Analysis  
 A motion to reopen before the BIA must be filed within 90 days after the date of 
the final administrative decision “in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”  8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c)(2).  The 90-day time limit, however, does not apply where the motion to 
reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the 
country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not 
available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing . . ..”  8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
 Zhang and Chen have petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of their motion to 
reopen.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We review the BIA’s 
denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. 
v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The BIA’s factual determinations must be upheld if “supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Immigration & 
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Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (internal quotations 
omitted); Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Because Petitioners’ motion to reopen was not filed with the BIA within 90 days 
of the April 27, 2010, decision and the evidence presented did not support changed 
conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to 
reopen the proceedings.  The BIA’s determination that Petitioners failed to demonstrate 
changed country conditions in China is supported by substantial evidence, which shows 
not that China’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners has worsened but that, after the 
merits hearing, China’s response to Falun Gong has remained constant.   Zheng v. Att’y 
Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008).  Moreover, the affidavit and village notice were 
not authenticated and otherwise do not indicate punishment for Falun Gong practitioners 
that is more severe than at the time of the merits hearing. 
 Moreover, as to Chen, the only change in circumstances that she could 
demonstrate was her adoption of Falun Gong, which she contends began when she met 
her husband in the United States.  We have held, however, that such a change in 
“personal circumstances” does not constitute a change in country conditions in China to 
excuse an alien from complying with a time limit on a motion to reopen under § 
1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 149-51 (3d Cir. 2009).  Accordingly, 
for the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
